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Previous research has shown that humorous reappraisal can reduce elicited negative
emotions, suggesting that humor may be a functional strategy to cope with emotionally
negative situations. However, the effect of humorous reappraisal on later memory about
the emotion-eliciting situation is currently unknown, although this is crucial for more
adaptive responding in future situations. To address this issue, we examined the effects
of humorous reappraisal on both emotional experience and memory, compared to
non-humorous rational reappraisal and a non-reappraisal control condition. Replicating
previous findings, humorous reappraisal reduced evoked negative valence and arousal
levels very effectively, and the down-regulation of experienced negative emotions was
even more pronounced after humorous compared to rational reappraisal. Regarding
later memory for emotion-eliciting stimuli, both humorous and rational reappraisal
reduced free recall, but recognition memory was unaffected, with memory strength
being stronger after humorous than after rational reappraisal. These results indicate
that humor seems to be indeed an optimal strategy to cope with negative situations
because humor can help us to feel better when confronted with negative stimuli, but still
allows us to retrieve stimulus information later when afforded to do so by the presence
of appropriate contextual features.
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Introduction
A central question of emotion research is how to functionally regulate evoked negative emotional
experiences. As suggested early in psychoanalytic theory (Freud, 1905/1960, 1928), one promising
strategy to functionally regulate negative emotional experiences may be humor. Indeed, such an
assumption seems to be supported by more recent experimental research, showing that viewing
negative stimuli in a humorous way can reduce the strength of elicited negative emotions (e.g.,
Strick et al., 2009; Samson and Gross, 2012; Samson et al., 2014). Such beneﬁcial eﬀects of humor
have been attributed to a number of mechanisms such as cognitive distraction from negative stimuli
(e.g., Strick et al., 2009), cognitive reappraisal of negative stimuli in less threatening ways (e.g.,
Samson and Gross, 2012), and an “undoing” of negative by positive emotions (Fredrickson et al.,
2000).
However, in order to more fundamentally evaluate the functionality of an emotion regulation
strategy, it is not enough to look at the eﬀects of emotion regulation on the strength of emotional
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responding in the current situation. Rather, it is additionally
important to take into account the eﬀects of emotion regulation
on later memory about the emotion-eliciting event (e.g., Richards
and Gross, 2000). Basically, emotions are assumed to exist for the
sake of signaling the consequences of a stimulus for one’s motives
and goals (e.g., Frijda, 1988), with negative emotions signaling
that stimuli may be harmful. Accordingly, in order to prepare the
organism for a more adaptive responding in future situations, it
would be adaptive to retain the emotion-eliciting stimuli as well
as possible, an assumption which is supported by the fact that
later memory for negative stimuli is typically enhanced compared
to neutral stimuli (see Hamann, 2001, for a review). Thus, if
an emotion regulation strategy would down-regulate negative
emotional experiences at the cost of reduced memory for the
emotion-eliciting event, it may help in the short term to cope
with negative emotional experiences in the current situation, but
it may be detrimental for a more adaptive responding to the
negative event in future situations.
Although the eﬀects of humor on the strength of elicited
negative emotions when confronted with negative stimuli have
been examined in previous research, to our knowledge, research
on the eﬀects of humor on later memory about negative stimuli
is lacking. In particular, the suggested mechanisms that may
underlie the eﬀects of humor on experienced emotions make
rather diﬀerent predictions about how humor may aﬀect later
memory. If the beneﬁcial eﬀect of humor on experienced
emotions is based on the mechanism that humorous processing
requires attentional resources so that people are distracted from
negative stimuli (Strick et al., 2009), later memory for negative
stimuli should be decreased because attention is a prerequisite
for later memory (e.g., Mulligan, 2008), an assumption which is
supported by the ﬁnding that emotion regulation by distraction
seems to reduce later memory for the emotion eliciting event
(e.g., Sheppes and Meiran, 2007). If the beneﬁcial eﬀect of
humor on experienced emotions is based on a cognitive
reinterpretation of negative stimuli in less threatening ways
(Samson and Gross, 2012), later memory may not be aﬀected by
humor because the emotion-eliciting event is still fully attended,
an assumption which is supported by the ﬁnding that (non-
humorous) cognitive reappraisal seems not reduce later memory
(Richards and Gross, 2000; Hayes et al., 2010). Finally, it may
even be that humor enhances later memory for humorously
reappraised negative stimuli. If the beneﬁcial eﬀect of humor
on experienced negative emotions is based on an undoing of
negative by positive emotions, the evoked positive emotions
may bring about an additional boost for memory (e.g., Herbert
et al., 2008), an assumption which is supported by ﬁndings that
humorous material is better remembered than neutral material
(e.g., Schmidt, 1994, 2002; Carlson, 2011).
The aim of the present study was to examine the eﬀects
of humorous emotion regulation on both current emotional
experiences and later memory about emotion-eliciting stimuli.
Basically, we followed the procedure introduced by Samson and
Gross (2012) and Samson et al. (2014) where participants rate
their emotional responses to negative pictures that are shown
with the instruction to either simply view the pictures (control
condition), rationally reappraise the pictures (rational reappraisal
condition), or humorously reappraise the pictures (humorous
reappraisal condition). However, in order to overcome a few
methodological shortcomings of previous studies, a number of
changes were made. First, we included not only emotionally
negative pictures but also emotionally neutral pictures in
order to be able to examine whether the eﬀects of humorous
reappraisal are similar for neutral and negative pictures, or
speciﬁc to negative pictures. Second, to standardize reappraisal,
rather than asking participants to provide individual remarks
in the reappraisal conditions, pictures were accompanied by
standardized written humorous or rationalizing comments
(for examples, see Figure 1). Third, in order to control for
the potential confounding eﬀect that pictures in the control
condition are simply viewed whereas pictures in the reappraisal
conditions are additionally verbally processed, pictures in the
control condition were shown with a written comment as
well that simply described the picture content. After picture
presentation, memory for the pictures was assessed both for
free recall and recognition memory, in order to obtain a
comprehensive view of the eﬀects of humor on later memory.
With respect to the eﬀects of humor on the strength of elicited
emotional experiences, we expected that humorous reappraisals
should down-regulate evoked negative emotions, replicating
ﬁndings by Samson and Gross (2012). In particular, based
on the recent ﬁndings of Samson et al. (2014), we expected
that humorous reappraisal should be more eﬀective in down-
regulating negative emotions than rational reappraisal because
the elicitation of positive emotions involved in humorously
reappraisal can help to further “undo” negative emotions beyond
the eﬀects of purely rational reappraisal. With respect to the
eﬀects of humor on later memory for reappraised stimuli, if the
beneﬁcial eﬀects of humor on emotional experiences are mainly
based on cognitive distraction, memory performance should
be decreased in the humorous reappraisal condition compared
to the other conditions. If the beneﬁcial eﬀects of humor
on emotional experiences are based on cognitive reappraisal,
memory performance should be similar between the humorous
and rational reappraisal conditions, and according to the ﬁndings
by Richards and Gross (2000), memory performance in the
reappraisal conditions should be comparable to the control
condition. If the beneﬁcial eﬀects of humor on emotional
experiences are based on an undoing of negative by positive
emotions, memory performance in the humorous reappraisal




To detect small-sized eﬀects (d = 0.4, α = 0.05) with suﬃcient
power (0.80), a sample size of 52 is required. Therefore, we
planned to collect data from at least 52 participants until
the end of the semester. This resulted in a sample of 63
undergraduate students (45 females, mean age = 24.92 years,
SD = 4.61), who participated for course credit. Each person
was tested individually. The study was conducted in accordance
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with the Helsinki Declaration and the University Research Ethics
Standards.
Materials
Twenty-four neutral and twenty-four negative pictures were
selected. Most of the pictures were drawn from the International
Aﬀective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 1999), additionally,
three of the neutral pictures were taken from the Geneva
aﬀective picture database (GAPED; Dan-Glauser and Scherer,
2011). Pictures were chosen by the criteria of reasonableness and
diﬀerentiability, and every negative picture was yoked with a
visually similar neutral picture. Negative pictures were selected
to be more negatively valenced and more arousing than neutral
pictures (Valence: MNegative = 2.84, SD = 0.65; MNeutral = 5.33,
SD = 0.52; Arousal: MNegative = M = 5.59, SD = 0.80;
MNeutral = 3.79, SD= 1.01).
For each picture, a humorous, a rationalizing, and a
neutral comment were generated (all comments are provided
as Supplementary Material; for examples, see Figure 1). The
humorous comments reﬂected a positive form of humor in the
sense of Samson and Gross (2012) and were generated according
to their instructions (i.e., reappraising in a benevolent and
amusing way without becoming hostile or aggressive, focusing on
absurdities of situations). The rationalizing comments reﬂected
a rational form of cognitive reappraisal in the sense of Richards
and Gross (2000), and were generated according to their
instructions (i.e., adopting a neutral attitude when watching a
picture by thinking about it objectively and analytically); the
non-reappraisal comments verbally described what could be seen
on the picture. The three types of comments were matched on
the number of words (MHumorous = 14.52, MRational = 14.56,
MNeutral = 13.96).
Design and Procedure
A 2 × 3 within-subject design was used with the factors
of emotional content of a picture (neutral vs. negative) and
reappraisal condition (humorous vs. rational vs. neutral). The
participants were shown the 24 neutral and 24 negatives pictures
on a computer screen in random order using E-Prime 2.0 (PST,
Pittsburgh, PA, USA) with the instruction to rate their emotional
responses to each picture on valence (1 = extremely negative to
9 = extremely positive) and arousal (1 = not at all aroused to
9 = extremely aroused). No mention was made that memory
for the pictures will be tested later. One third of the neutral,
respectively, negative, pictures were shown with a humorous
comment, one third with a rationalizing comment, and one third
with a neutral comment. The assignment of type of comments to
the pictures was counterbalanced across participants.
Each picture was shown for 10 s at the center of the screen
with the comment displayed below the picture (see Figure 1).
Participants were instructed to look at the pictures as long
as they were presented and to read the respective comments
carefully. After presentation of each picture, the valence and
arousal scales were shown and participants made their ratings
without any time restriction. After the presentation of all 48
pictures, a 1-min distractor phase followed in which participants
FIGURE 1 | Procedure of the experiment. Participants were shown 24
negative and 24 neutral pictures provided with a non-reappraisal control, a
rational, or a humorous comment in random order. Each picture was rated on
experienced emotional valence and arousal. After picture presentation, a
surprise memory test followed. In a first free recall test, participants were asked
to verbally describe as many of the previously presented pictures as possible. In
a subsequent recognition test, all initially presented pictures were shown again
together with 48 new pictures, and participants were instructed to indicate
whether a picture was old or new. In order to measure memory strength of
recognized pictures, we used a successive disclosure procedure where
participants were asked to press a button as soon as they were able to identify
a picture as having been shown before. The picture printed here is for example
only; to maintain the research value of the images in the International Affective
Picture System (IAPS), we have not included actually shown IAPS pictures.
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had to solve simple arithmetic problems. A surprise free recall
test for the presented pictures followed, in which participants
were instructed to verbally describe on a provided sheet as many
of the previously presented pictures as could be recalled any
time restriction. After another 1-min distractor phase, a surprise
recognition memory test followed. Participants were shown all
initially presented pictures again together with 48 new pictures
(24 negative and 24 neutral pictures, taken from the IAPS and
GAPED data bases) in random order. In order to measure
not only general recognition memory in an all-or-none fashion
but also assess the memory strength of recognized pictures,
we used a successive disclosure procedure. Each picture was
presented in 100 gradation slides in ascending order, starting with
a completely gray slide until the picture was entirely visible. Each
gradation slide was shown for 66 ms so that the picture sequence
appeared as a continuum. Participants were asked to press a
button as soon as they were able to identify a picture as having
been shown before. If the disclosed picture was judged to be new,
they were asked to wait until the picture was fully visible without
pressing any button. General recognition memory was measured
as the proportion of correctly recognized pictures independently
of when the button was pressed during the disclosure sequence,
and memory strength was measured as the time necessary for
correctly recognizing a previously presented picture.
Results
Elicited Emotions
Figure 2 shows valence (Figure 2A) and arousal (Figure 2B)
ratings of participants as a function of emotional content of
pictures and reappraisal condition. To analyze the eﬀect of type
of reappraisal on emotional experiences, we conducted analyses
of variances (ANOVA) for valence and arousal ratings with
factors of emotional content of pictures (neutral vs. negative)
and reappraisal condition (humorous vs. rational vs. control). For
valence, there was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of emotional content
of pictures, F(1,62) = 152.62, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.71, indicating
that negative pictures were much more negatively experienced
than neutral pictures. There was also a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of
reappraisal condition, F(2,124) = 14.94, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.19,
indicating that experienced negativity varied as a function of
type of reappraisal. The interaction between both factors was also
signiﬁcant, F(2,124) = 10.60, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.15, indicating
that the diﬀerential eﬀects of reappraisal type diﬀered between
neutral and negative pictures. For negative pictures, humorous
reappraisal increased valence ratings compared to both the
control condition, t(62) = 6.40, p < 0.001, d = 0.81, 95% CI:
0.43 to 0.81, and the rational reappraisal condition, t(62) = 5.84,
p < 0.001, d = 0.74, 95% CI: 0.35 to 0.72; valence ratings did not
FIGURE 2 | Results of the experiment. (A) Emotional valence ratings
(1 = extremely negative to 9 = extremely positive), (B) emotional arousal ratings
(1 = not at all aroused to 9 = extremely aroused), (C) free recall performance,
and (D) recognition performance as a function of emotional content of pictures
(neutral, negative) and reappraisal condition (control, rational, humorous). The
left panel in (D) shows recognition accuracy (probability of correct recall), the
right panels shows the time needed to correctly identify a previously presented.
Error bars represent SE.
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signiﬁcantly diﬀer between the rational reappraisal and control
conditions, t(62) = 1.07, p = 0.290, d = 0.13, 95% CI: –0.07
to 0.25 For neutral pictures, valence ratings did not signiﬁcantly
diﬀer between conditions, F(2,124)= 1.02, p= 0.364, η2p = 0.02.
For arousal, there also were signiﬁcant main eﬀects of
emotional content of pictures, F(1,62) = 97.35, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.61, and reappraisal condition, F(2,124)= 5.96, p= 0.003,
η2p = 0.09, and a signiﬁcant interaction between both factors,
F(2,124) = 20.86, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.25. For negative pictures,
both humorous and rational reappraisal decreased arousal
ratings, compared to the control condition, t(62) = –2.71,
p = 0.009, d = 0.34, 95% CI: –0.46 to –0.07, and t(62) = –
2.86, p = 0.006, d = 0.36, 95% CI: –0.45 to –0.08, respectively;
arousal ratings between the humorous and rational reappraisal
conditions did not diﬀer, t(62) = 0.00, p = 0.999, d = 0.00,
95% CI: –0.20 to 0.20. For neutral pictures, humorous reappraisal
increased arousal ratings compared to both the control condition,
t(62) = 3.43, p = 0.001, d = 0.43, 95% CI: 0.20 to 0.77, and the
rational reappraisal condition, t(62) = 4.67, p < 0.001, d = 0.59,
95% CI: 0.36 to 0.94, whereas arousal ratings did not signiﬁcantly
diﬀer between the rational reappraisal and control conditions,
t(62) = –1.55, p= 0.126, d = 0.20, 95% CI: –0.39 to 0.05.
Memory Performance
Free Recall
Figure 2C shows free recall memory performance as a function
of emotional content of pictures and reappraisal condition. An
ANOVA with factors of emotional picture content (neutral vs.
negative) and reappraisal condition (neutral vs. humorous vs.
rational) revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of picture content,
F(1,62) = 70.84, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.53, indicating that negative
pictures were much better remembered than neutral pictures.
There was also a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of reappraisal condition,
F(2,124) = 4.22, p = 0.017, η2p = 0.06, indicating that
memory performance varied as a function of type of reappraisal.
The interaction between both factors was not signiﬁcant,
F(2,124) = 0.66, p = 0.518, η2p = 0.01. Overall, compared to
the control condition, both humorous (MDecrease = –5.49%) and
rational reappraisal (MDecrease = –5.37%) decreased memory
performance, t(62) = –2.35, p = 0.022, d = 0.30, 95% CI: –
0.10 to −0.01, and t(62) = –2.98, p = 0.004, d = 0.38, 95%
CI: –0.09 to –0.02, respectively. Amount of decrease did not
diﬀer between the humorous and rational reappraisal conditions,
t(62) = –0.05, p = 0.961, d = 0.01. Analyzing data separately for
negative and neutral pictures revealed that for negative pictures,
memory performance was decreased both in the humorous
and rational reappraisal conditions, compared to the control
condition, t(62) = –2.51, p = 0.015, d = 0.31, 95% CI: –0.14
to –0.02, and t(62) = –2.12, p = 0.038, d = 0.27, 95% CI: –0.11
to 0.00, respectively. For neutral pictures, memory performance
did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer between conditions, F(2,124) = 1.20,
p= 0.304, η2p = 0.02.
Recognition
The false alarm rate was very low and did not vary as a function
of emotional contents of lures (MNegative = 2.05%, SD = 2.89;
MNeutral = 1.59%, SD = 2.84), t(62) = 1.12, p < 0.266, d = 0.14,
95% CI: 0.00 to 0.13. Figure 2D (left) shows the proportion
of correctly recognized pictures as a function of emotional
content of pictures and reappraisal condition. An ANOVA with
factors of emotional picture content (neutral vs. negative) and
reappraisal condition (neutral vs. humorous vs. rational) revealed
a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of picture content, F(1,62) = 5.44,
p= 0.023, η2p = 0.08, indicating that negative pictures were better
recognized than neutral pictures. There was also a signiﬁcant
main eﬀect of reappraisal condition, F(2,124) = 5.89, p = 0.004,
η2p = 0.09, indicating that recognition memory performance
varied as a function of type of reappraisal. The interaction
between both factors was also signiﬁcant, F(2,124) = 3.62,
p = 0.030, η2p = 0.06, indicating that the diﬀerential eﬀects of
reappraisal type diﬀered between neutral and negative pictures.
For negative pictures, recognition memory performance did
not signiﬁcantly diﬀer between conditions, F(2,124) = 0.53,
p = 0.590, η2p = 0.01. For neutral pictures, rational reappraisal
decreased recognition memory performance compared to both
the humorous condition, t(62) = –2.93, p = 0.005, d = 0.37,
95% CI: –0.06 to –0.01, and the control reappraisal condition,
t(62) = –2.87, p = 0.006, d = 0.36, 95% CI: –0.07 to –
0.01; recognition memory performance did not signiﬁcantly
diﬀer between the humorous reappraisal and control conditions,
t(62) = –0.241, p= 0.811, d = 0.03, 95% CI: –0.02 to 0.01.
Figure 2D (right) shows the time necessary for correctly
recognizing a previously presented picture, reﬂecting underlying
memory strength, as a function of emotional content of pictures
and reappraisal condition. An ANOVA with factors of emotional
picture content (neutral vs. negative) and reappraisal condition
(neutral vs. humorous vs. rational) revealed a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect of picture content, F(1,62) = 28.37, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.31,
indicating that negative pictures were more quickly recognized
than neutral pictures. There was also a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of
reappraisal condition, F(2,124) = 3.07, p = 0.050, η2p = 0.05,
indicating that recognition speed varied as a function of type
of reappraisal. The interaction between both factors was not
signiﬁcant, F(2,124) = 0.53, p = 0.591, η2p = 0.01. In the
rational reappraisal condition, recognition speed was decreased
compared to both the humorous condition, t(62) = –1.96,
p = 0.054, d = 0.25, 95% CI: –2.79 to 0.03, and the control
condition, t(62) = –2.43, p = 0.018, d = 0.31, 95% CI: –2.72
to –0.26. Recognition speed did not diﬀer between the humorous
and control conditions, t(62) = 0.16, p < 0.873, d = 0.02, 95%
CI: –1.27 to 1.49.
Discussion
In the present study, we investigated whether humor may
be a functional strategy to regulate negative emotions by
examining the eﬀects of humorous reappraisal compared to
rational reappraisal and non-reappraisal on evoked emotional
experiences and later memory for the emotion-eliciting stimuli.
The results showed that humor seems to be indeed an optimal
strategy to adaptively cope with stimuli that elicit negative
emotions. Regarding evoked emotional experiences, humorous
reappraisal reduced experienced negative valence and arousal,
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replicating previous ﬁndings (Samson and Gross, 2012). Thus,
humor can indeed help us to feel better when being confronted
with negative events. In particular, replicating the recent ﬁndings
by Samson et al. (2014), our results showed that humorous
reappraisal is more successful in down-regulating negative
emotions than rational reappraisal because rational reappraisal
reduced only arousal levels but not experienced negative valence.
Regarding later memory for emotion-eliciting stimuli, the
results showed that humorous reappraisal reduced free recall for
negative stimuli compared to non-reappraisal, indicating that
humor reduces the presence of previously experienced negative
events in mind when actively reconstructing our past. However,
the results for the recognition test showed that at the same
time recognition memory for negative stimuli was completely
intact in the humorous reappraisal condition, indicating that
emotion-eliciting events were still fully stored in memory. From
a functional perspective, such a pattern seems to be adaptive
because on the one hand, undergone negative experiences
less strongly inﬁltrate our minds when remembering our past
in contexts that do not match the previous emotion-eliciting
situation. On the other hand, however, when the contextual
information matches the features of the previous emotion-
eliciting situation, then past experiences can nevertheless be fully
retrieved in order to prepare for appropriate responding. In
particular, similar to the eﬀects on elicited emotional experiences,
humorous reappraisal seems to be even more functional than
rational reappraisal because rational reappraisal did not only
reduce free recall but also reduce the strength of recognition
memory.
There is still a debate on whether the eﬀectiveness of
humor as an emotion regulation strategy is attributable to
the mechanisms of cognitive distraction from negative stimuli
(e.g., Strick et al., 2009), or to cognitive reappraisal of negative
stimuli in less threatening ways (e.g., Samson and Gross, 2012).
Previous research has shown that distraction and reappraisal
diﬀer with respect to the consequences for later memories
about the emotion-eliciting event, with distraction, but not
reappraisal, impairing later recognition memory (e.g., Richards
and Gross, 2000; Sheppes and Meiran, 2007). Thus, the
ﬁnding of the present study that humorous reappraisal did not
impair recognition memory strongly supports the view that the
mechanism underlying humor as an emotion regulation strategy
is reappraisal.
Indeed, such a view is further supported by the ﬁnding
that humorous reappraisal diﬀerentially aﬀected recognition
memory and free recall. Whereas humor did not inﬂuence
recognition memory, free recall was impaired. Such a pattern
speaks against the assumption that distraction may underlie the
eﬀects of humorous reappraisal because previous research has
shown that cognitive distraction during encoding impairs both
free recall and recognition memory (e.g., Craik et al., 1996).
Instead, such diﬀerential eﬀects on recognition and free recall
support the assumption that the eﬀect of humor is based on
cognitive reappraisal. One factor which is known to diﬀerentially
inﬂuence free recall and recognition is whether processing during
encoding is focused on the relationship between a stimulus and
other stimuli (i.e., relational processing), or on the individual
characteristics of a stimulus (i.e., item-speciﬁc processing).
Whereas item-speciﬁc processing reduces free recall because the
memory representation of a stimulus is less strongly activated by
other stored stimuli so that active reproduction is impaired, item-
speciﬁc processing does not impair recognition memory because
an active reproduction of the to-be-remembered stimulus is
not necessary for recognition (e.g., Einstein and Hunt, 1980;
Engelkamp et al., 1998). Thus, as the attempt to reappraise a
stimulus in a humorous way requires focusing on the to-be-
reappraised stimulus, the underlying mechanism of the eﬀects
of humor on memory seems to be the induction of item-speciﬁc
processing.
In fact, a similar mechanism may explain the eﬀect of
rational reappraisal on memory. Replicating previous ﬁndings,
recognition accuracy for negative pictures was not impaired by
rational reappraisal (Richards and Gross, 2000; Hayes et al.,
2010). However, going beyond previous ﬁndings, the present
results demonstrate that free recall is impaired. Thus, similar to
humorous reappraisal, rational reappraisal seems also to induce
an item-speciﬁc processing of the to-be-reappraised stimuli,
leading to the observed diﬀerential eﬀects on later free recall
and recognition memory. However, with respect to the eﬀects on
elicited emotions, the results indicate that cognitive reappraisal
alone is less eﬀective in down-regulating negative emotions
than when the cognitive reappraisal additionally evokes positive
emotions due to a humorous reinterpretation of stimuli. Thus,
an evoking of positive emotions, as induced by humorous
reappraisal, seems to be necessary to really undo experienced
negative emotions (e.g., Fredrickson et al., 2000). However, the
undoing of negative by humor-induced positive emotions seems
not to be strong enough to bring about an additional boost in
memory.
One interesting ﬁnding of the present study is that rational
reappraisal was rather ineﬀective in down-regulating negative
emotions because only elicited emotional arousal but not negative
valence was reduced. On ﬁrst glance, such a ﬁnding seems to
deviate from previous studies showing decreased valence ratings
when rationally reappraising compared to when simply watching
emotion-eliciting stimuli in a non-reappraisal control condition
(e.g., Richards and Gross, 2000; Hayes et al., 2010). However,
a closer look reveals that there is one important diﬀerence
between the present and the previous studies. In previous studies,
reappraisal and control conditions diﬀered not only in terms of
reappraisal but also in terms of cognitive processing in general
because participants in the control condition were instructed to
simply watch the pictures, whereas in the reappraisal condition
additional cognitive processing was required. In the present
study, the control and reappraisal conditions were matched on
required cognitive processing in order to control for the potential
confounding eﬀect of cognitive processing in general. The ﬁnding
that the beneﬁts from rational reappraisal were rather small under
such conditions suggest that the down-regulating of negative
emotions found in previous studies may more likely reﬂect the
eﬀect of cognitive processing in general, rather than speciﬁc
eﬀects of rational reappraisal. Indeed, such an assumption is
supported by recent ﬁndings showing that additional cognitive
processing during the perception of emotional events can reduce
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negative emotions (e.g., Van Dillen and Koole, 2007; Strick et al.,
2009). However, given that the present study did not include a
condition where emotional stimuli were simply watched, further
research is needed to clarify the speciﬁc eﬀects of rational
reappraisal beyond the eﬀects of cognitive processing in general.
In the present study, the form of reappraisal employed
in the rational reappraisal condition reﬂected a rational form
of cognitive reappraisal where emotion regulation is based
on the attempt to adopt a neutral attitude when watching
a picture by thinking about it objectively and analytically
(e.g., Richards and Gross, 2000). However, there are other
forms of cognitively reappraising emotionally negative situations,
such as trying to think about a situation in a more positive
light, or thinking about the positive bearing an event could
have on the persons involved in the situation (e.g., Troy
et al., 2010). One important diﬀerence between these diﬀerent
forms of cognitive reappraisals is that the latter one may
additionally elicit positive emotions due to the thinking about
potential positive aspects of the given negative situation.
Thus, it may be that such “positive” forms of cognitive
reappraisal may be similar eﬀective than humorous reappraisal
where the elicitation of positive emotions seems to play an
important role as well, an open question that warrants future
research.
Conclusion
Humor seems to be indeed an especially functional emotion
regulation strategy that can outperform other emotion regulation
strategies such as rational reappraisal. Thus, Freud (1905/1960)
may have been right in assuming that humor can be seen as the
most valuable high-level defense of unpleasure.
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